The Bhutanese Leading the way.
Excerpts from the forthcoming book “The Contractual Monarchy: Modern Buddhist Kingship in Bhutan”
By Dasho Sonam Kinga
Even as Bhutan was grappling with the security threat posed by illegal immigrants and ngolops, another severe threat emerged. This came in the form of Indian militants from the Northeast Indian states of Assam and West Bengal entering Bhutan illegally and setting up camps in the forests of southern Bhutan.
The origins of the militant movement lay in illegal immigration into Northeast India. In particular, the demographic transformation of Assam created apprehension among many Assamese that the swamping of Assam by foreigners and non-Assamese Indians would lead to the Assamese being reduced to a minority in their own land, and consequently to the subordination of their language and culture, loss of control over their economy and governance, and, in the end, the loss of their very identity and individuality as a people. The estimated number of illegal foreigners in Assam was thought to be between 4.5 and 5 million, or 31 to 34 percent of Assam’s total population, which was 14.6 million in 1971.
A popular movement known as the Assam Movement emerged in response to the demographic threat. It was directed against foreigners, particularly Bangladeshis, but also Nepalese. Meanwhile, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) was formed in 1979, coinciding with the onset of the Assam Movement. Its goal was to wage an armed struggle against the Indian Government and for the independence of Assam. The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) was formed in 1986 to advocate for separate statehood, aiming to preserve the Bodo culture, language, and identity. Likewise, the Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO) was formed in West Bengal in 1995 to address the numerous socio-economic and cultural issues that the indigenous people felt were neglected by their government.
The Indian government designated these as terrorist organizations. In the early 1990s, the Indian Army launched major military operations, known as Operations Bajrang and Rhino, against the militants. Since Bhutan was too preoccupied with the problem of illegal immigration and ngolops, the militants took advantage of the porous border and took sanctuary in the dense forests.
They established numerous camps across the southern border. The militant orientation of their ideology, objective, and operations posed a serious security risk to Bhutan and endangered Indo-Bhutan friendship.
They would conduct hit-and-run operations against the Indian armed forces from bases in Bhutan, and then flee back into the sanctuary of camps in Bhutanese forests. The blatant disregard for the convenience, safety, and dignity of the Bhutanese people by the militants was expressed in a growing sense of complacency, taking everything for granted. They also abducted and murdered Bhutanese civilians.
King Jigme Singye Wangchuck personally visited all the camps on multiple occasions. He asked them to leave peacefully, rather than jeopardizing Bhutan’s relations with India and its two neighbouring states. The arrogance of the militants was such that they told Bhutan to prioritize more than 2,000 years of relationship with Assam and Bengal over a mere 50-year relationship with independent India.
For Bhutan, pursuing a peaceful course to address the issue was the priority. Bhutan valued its relations with India. It was feared that a military option would boomerang in many ways. Firstly, it would undermine the centuries-old relations that have existed between the bordering communities of the two nations. Secondly, Bhutanese travellers who use the Bengal and Assam highways to commute between South-eastern and South-western Bhutan could be targeted in reprisal. Thirdly, the Royal Bhutan Army had not been engaged in actual military combat since its founding and may be unprepared to engage with battle-hardened militants.
Years of discussion in the National Assembly called for peaceful means and resolutions. For example, it was resolved that shopkeepers and villagers must not sell provisions to the militants. It asked the government to hold talks with the militants, who would send low-level officers to the negotiations as if to snub the Bhutanese. Although His Majesty had devolved executive power to an elected government in 1998 and stepped aside to remain only as the head of state, the National Assembly still resolved that he must shoulder full responsibility for the country’s security and placed their full trust and confidence in his leadership.
The Indian army wanted to come after the militants in Bhutan. However, that was not a desirable option for Bhutan. Years of peaceful dialogue and attempts to persuade the militants to leave Bhutan failed. So, there was no option left but to launch a military operation. The militants were given a deadline to vacate the area. Still, they took Bhutan’s seriousness and demonstration of preparedness for military conflict as a mere hoax, all sound and fury, signifying nothing.
In the early hours of December 13, 2003, the Royal Bhutan Armed Forces began to move into pre-identified positions with stealth and determination throughout southern Bhutan. His Majesty had planned the operation as a means of last resort. It was executed with precision and secrecy, so that not even the top commanders were aware of the plan’s details, which he had prepared down to the last detail. The plans were shared on the cusp of the operations. The element of surprise was key to his strategy. At 9 am that day, the armed forces began to pound all militants’ positions simultaneously in southern Bhutan. His Majesty personally led the operations, not from the army headquarters or the capital, but right in the thick forests, alongside his soldiers. For a ruler or monarch to personally lead soldiers into battle is unheard of in the 20th century. Peter Conradi wrote in his book The Great Survivors: How Monarchy made it into the twenty-first century (2013) thus: “No European monarch these days would lead his or her army into battle: for a start, most would not have the know-how.”
Within less than three days of the military operations, all the camps were destroyed, the top commanders of the militants captured, and the militants evicted. This stunning operation, conducted with speed and precision, surprised even the best of military strategists and planners. Never did they expect a small, ill-equipped, and inexperienced army to defeat highly trained and experienced guerrilla fighters. Bhutan’s loss was minimal, with eleven soldiers who made the ultimate sacrifice. The victory was total, but His Majesty commanded that no victory celebration of any kind should be held. Instead, the country mourned and prayed for the lives lost on both sides. The militants who either surrendered or were captured were treated with care and compassion. Eventually, they were handed over to India.
Since Bhutan’s last civil war in 1885, the Indian militants posed the most serious threat to Bhutan’s security and sovereignty. The manner in which His Majesty addressed this threat had attained mythic proportions. Her Majesty Ashi Dorji Wangmo Wangchuck initiated the construction of 108 sacred stupas on the high Dochula pass in Thimphu known as the Druk Wangyal Choeten. They honour His Majesty’s sacrifice and leadership as well as those who lost their lives in the conflict. Every year, on December 13, the Druk Wangyal festival at Dochula commemorates the victory of the Bhutanese armed forces under the leadership of His Majesty.
The writer is the former National Council Chairman and currently a World Fellow at the International Leadership Centre, Yale University, USA
